HYBRID WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS IN FAILING STATES
They which builded on the wall and they that bare burdens, with those that laded, every one with one of his hands wrought in the work, and with the other hand held a weapon.
-Nehemiah 4:17
A New Strategic Concept for the GWOT The terrorist threat of today's global war on terrorism (GWOT) is peculiarly transnational, seeking to expand its ideological influence across geographic boundaries into regions where the central governments are weak and their internal security forces insufficient to resist infiltration.
The opponents seek to expand their ideological influence across geographic boundaries into regions where host nation central governments are weak and their internal security forces insufficient to resist infiltration.
US National Security Strategy correctly identifies so-called failed and failing states as particularly vulnerable to these threats. The current strategy advocates preventing conflict and state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction and stabilization, and looks to the US Department of State (DOS) to take the lead in resourcing and implementing it. However, in practice this strategy is failing to accomplish its stated objectives for several reasons.
First of all, DOS lacks the organic resources, expertise, and personnel to implement the variety and scope of economic and political development programs sufficient to build institutional capacity of failing states to prevent the spread of terrorist ideology and resources in failing states. Indeed the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the chief arm of DOS in disseminating US aid, relies heavily on private contractors to implement its programs.
Such outsourcing of organizations to administer US aid dollars adds additional layers of bureaucracy to the process resulting slower response time to developing crises.
Secondly, USAID programs and supporting non-governmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs) are staffed and implemented by civilians. As such, they are illequipped or simply unable to work in hostile or non-permissive environments. However, such environments are characteristics of failed and failing states, where government forces and terrorist organizations vie for control. Thus, the very regions where the US National Strategy for stabilization and security is most needed are the same environments where the chief agency for implementing this strategy is effectively precluded from operating.
Finally, US stability and security operations to date have been primarily reactive, rather than pro-active, in seeking resources and strategies to inhibit establishment of terrorist strongholds in failing states. Indeed, billions of US dollars have been devoted to reconstruction operations in countries such as Afghanistan where the US has first resorted to military force to drive out terrorism and now seeks to prevent its return by building that nation's capacity to transition to democracy and sustainable peace. Again, the resulting ground conditions are typically too hostile and unsafe for civilian agencies to operate effectively. In light of these conditions, at present the US military is the sole effective agency to implement current national strategy for security, stabilization, and reconstruction in failed and failing states, wrestling with the threat of terrorist ideologies for political, economic and social control.
Given that the opponent's center of gravity is ideological rather than kinetic, to achieve GWOT objectives, the US military needs to refine its implementation of the strategy in order to counter this threat before it has a chance to take root. In particular, the military needs to develop a prophylactic capability to combine security and stability operations along with infrastructure reconstruction to prevent and eject terrorist infiltration into vulnerable regions, while simultaneously being prepared to respond with deadly force if the security environment suddenly turns hostile. Today more than ever, the US military needs a new strategic concept to respond globally to a startling array of volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environments and to counter regional terrorist threats conducting unconventional and irregular warfare across geographic boundaries in failed and failing states.
This paper develops the case for a broader, more pro-active employment of the US military to implement National Security Strategy for stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) in fighting the global war on terrorism. It first examines the broader vision of war as evolving along a continuum of policy objectives, in order to develop a new strategic concept for using military capacities in a kind of "hybrid war" in non-permissive environments. This paper then defines failed states and evolution and nature of stability and security operations that emerge from them. Finally, the paper covers development of SSTR as a core military mission, its doctrine, and its role in peace building lays the foundation for developing and deploying US military units in hybrid war. In conclusion, this paper discusses the future of hybrid war in SSTR operations.
War as a Continuum
Prussian strategist, Karl von Clausewitz, wrote that one cannot understand war without understanding the broader political and social implications of the context in which it is executed.
In particular, he posited that war is never an isolated act, but rather must be considered as occurring somewhere along a continuum starting with armed observation through absolute war.
Where war breaks out along this continuum determines the level and type of force to be applied to achieve the actor's objectives and their political and social implications. Identifying trends and precursors to states 'at risk' for terrorist infiltration, will require strategic thinkers to focus on nations within the "non-integrated gap" described by Thomas P.M. foreign states at risk from conflict or civil strife. 13 The current 2006 National Security Strategy specifically cites failing and ungoverned spaces with weak governments as requiring outside assistance to regain control of its borders and develop the capacity to resist infiltration of terrorist elements into ill-governed areas in an otherwise functioning state.
Barnett in The Pentagon
To further (sic) counter terrorist exploitation of under-governed lands, we will promote effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and prosperity. In failing states or states emerging from conflict, the risks are significant. Spoilers can take advantage of instability to create conditions terrorists can exploit. We will continue to work with foreign partners and international organizations to help prevent conflict and respond to state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization so that countries in transition can reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and prosperity. Our terrorist enemies are striving to claim a strategic country as a haven for terror. From this base, they could destabilize the Middle East and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow… We will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or undergoverned areas as safehavens -secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. Ultimately, we will eliminate these havens altogether…. other countries in transition from conflict and helping them reach a sustainable path towards peaceful, democratic, and market-oriented societies. 17 The emphasis of the new S/CRS is to strengthen the U.S. government's institutional capacity to deal with crises in failing states and to reconstruct and stabilize societies recovering from conflict and civil strife. 18 The S/CRS' stated goal is to provide an operational field response to post-conflict situations that emphasizes facilitation of peace implementation processes, coordination with international and local institutions and individuals that are developing transition strategies. In addition S/CRS will help implement transitional governance arrangements; encourage conflicting factions to work together; develop strategies to promote transitional security;
coordinate with other US government agencies and the US military; foreign agencies and armed forces; and, if necessary, prepare a diplomatic base on the ground. 19 Clearly, the goals and objectives of our national strategy and the S/CRS and the US government agencies and organizations supporting it, are focused in the right direction to address the requirements peculiar to post conflict stability and reconstruction operations.
However, the focus of this strategy is primarily on assisting governments in transition, rebuilding stability and national infrastructure and other stabilizing operations after conflict has occurred.
Building stability and security in pre-conflict situations and preventing conflict through prophylactic use of elements of national power is not considered. Yet this application of stability and security operations clearly is vital in failed and failing states, where prevention of the establishment of opportunistic terrorist movements is key to maintaining the initiative in the GWOT and protecting US national security interests.
Ideally, such strategies would be developed and implemented through diplomatic, informational, and economic application of elements of national power. 20 Indeed, the US State Department and key interagency members such as the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, along with national and international non-governmental organizations are typically expected to fill these requirements. However, a typical characteristic of these failed or failing states is that traditional systems of public safety and law enforcement are weak or non-existent.
These systems are replaced by warlordism, corruption, and ad hoc protectionism available to the highest bidder. As currently configured, the US agencies and organizations tasked to carry out such operations are staffed exclusively by civilians and thus are neither equipped nor resourced to operate in radically unstable, hostile or nonpermissive environments. The environments in which terrorism and its resultant threats to US national security, thrives best are the ones most dangerous and least amenable to these non-military projections of national power by unarmed, civilian operators. However, it is these environments which are best suited to use of US military capabilities whose missions can range from humanitarian involvement to direct combat power. For example, one humanitarian mission for which the US military is superbly prepared is responding to natural disasters. Two recent successful efforts at winning good will both involved the military. One was the dispatch of soldiers to help new doctrine for resourcing diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power through plans that support the DoD policy objectives.
Developing SSTR Doctrine
As the complex global threat from failed states or ungoverned space increases, strategic thinkers will be called on more and more to develop the theory and doctrine of hybrid war where military is called to perform operations ranging across a very wide spectrum from diplomatic and economic development and infrastructure improvements to more traditional war operations such as countering direct terrorist threats and combat operations. Additionally, strategic military thinkers will need to become more adept in identifying trends and precursors to state failure and other unstable conditions that result in ungoverned or undergoverned spaces.
The traditional approach, wherein the military quickly hands off development and stability operations to international organizations, such as the UN, or other regional governing body, such as the African Union, must be transformed, however, if the hybrid war strategy is to be maximally effective. In short, uniformed forces must shoulder much more of the development burden, for far longer periods of time, often in non-permissive environments. The Department of Defense has begun to recognize these requirements with DoD Directive 3000.05. In some cases, hybrid war campaigns will last for a number of years, even over decades. The military units assigned must, like Nehemiah, carry both a sword and a shovel.
A stable peace is built on four pillars: security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. 31 Success in each area depends on the effective integration and interaction across them. Collective and individual security of all activities of every day living are preconditions for operating under the other pillars. A country menaced internally or externally by conflict often lacks the mechanism or institutions to provide for its own security, uphold the rule of law, or address human rights abuses. Its government may be nonexistent or too weak to provide services to its citizenry or improve their socioeconomic livelihoods. SSTR operations must, therefore, approach stabilization and reconstruction as a national, governmental, mission, rather than as solely military or civilian, to enable the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to be harnessed and integrated effectively.
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The proposed approach to SSTR concentrates on the middle two pillars: economic development and enhancing the rule of law. In Thomas Barnett's concept, it prepares the state for connecting to the global trading system by building an environment receptive to foreign direct investment (FDI): "FDI does not flow into war zones, because it is essentially a coward -all money is". 33 Complexity will increase as stability operations embrace multiple partners, coalition forces, interagency players, international organizations, none-governmental organizations, and host nation officials. Further, future SSTR operations will probably occur in urban areas, requiring greater interaction with local populations and the media.
Traditionally, the US has considered combat and post-combat operations as two distinct phases, conceptualized as a linear progression from peace to conflict, to post-conflict peace. As US experience in Iraq demonstrates, SSTR operations will likely occur in environments where the mix between conflict and peace shifts as the main effort transitions from combat to peacekeeping operations.
Use of US military forces in future SSTR operations must encompass much more than post-conflict operations to achieve strategic ends. As Clausewitz envisioned, military activity occurs at different stages along a continuum of policy implementation. Where war occurs on this continuum determines the level and type of force applicable. To be effective in implementing US national policy for stabilizing failing states and resisting the flow of terrorist groups or insurgencies into ungoverned spaces, hybrid war must take place well before the indigenous government fails and the initiative for stability is lost. In short, to be effective for security stabilization, hybrid war needs to be implemented early in the continuum of US involvement in 'at risk' states, and hybrid warriors, with their shovels and weapons, deployed well before hostilities occur. 
SSTR Capabilities in Hybrid War
On the operational level military action will be called on to extend stabilizing political and economic influence to an unstable territory through peaceful, indirect methods. On the tactical level small company-or battalion-sized teams of highly-trained and equipped combat forces, picked for both their combat and specialized civilian skills, will look to build schools, health clinics, and water systems that extend the local government's influence in the area. They will bolster lagging economic and employment situations with programs in small business and other skills training and micro loans. They will enhance establishment of the rule of law through education in judicial reform and by improving efficiency of public safety systems. They will improve road and communication systems, not only enhancing education but also allowing communities better access to global markets and resources.
Assessed strategically, these conditions, if successfully established, enhance foreign investment in the private market, develop two-way international trade and so improve the local and regional economic and social stability. These conditions are essential to promoting and securing political and regional stability and national governments friendly to US interests.
Further, they deny or arrest development of adverse conditions which might attract and nurture opposing governments or political/military movements.
If the environment turns more hostile from any overt source, these same teams are readily capable of shifting ways and means to a more tactically focused use of direct force. Relying on their inherent legal right to use deadly force for self-protection, these same teams are capable of moving up the Clausewitzian continuum to use that amount of force necessary to continue meeting their objectives. In this phase, understanding the limits of just how much pressure can
or cannot be applied to the hostile force is essential. The team's combat skills of preparing and synchronizing all elements of power for tactical, air, artillery, and mortars can come into focus in case direct force becomes necessary. This activity communicates a more direct and ominous message to hostile forces, whether they are regular armed forces or irregular members of an insurgency, terrorist organization, or non-state actor, i.e.: The US military is planning on staying and is serious about and extremely capable of using deadly force.
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Upon achieving sufficient security to return to reconstruction and stability operations, the team will shift its position along the continuum of operations to resume the therapeutic forms of this warfare. The teams will commence immediate assessments and secure intelligence updates on the condition of the local and regional resources and infrastructure, risk factors, sector overviews and financial and commercial structure. They can then translate this information into necessary tactical and operational missions designed to continue the original or modified strategic goals of stabilization and promotion of interests favorable to our own.
To develop military units that are best suited for hybrid war will require new combinations of capabilities from forces optimized for major combat operations. Stability and reconstruction no longer can be viewed as a lesser included set of capabilities already found in a Brigade
Combat Team or Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Rather, combinations of Army and Marine
Corps Civil Affairs Brigades and Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (SeaBees) can be built upon and modified to develop the needed capabilities. These will evolve as the needs of the region and countries served require. Force structure, both active duty and reserve component, will need to be added so that rotational forward deployments can be made on a predictable long term basis without undue stress on the troops. Navy SeaBees and USMC Marine Expeditionary
Battalions have proven this feasible over decades before the stress and surge of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
For the US military, precursors to hybrid war have been evolving at the tactical and operational level for several years. 37 Pre-conflict stability operations, so called "Phase 0"
operations, have recently become a consideration in national strategy planning. "Shaping" the environment was a key part of U.S. strategy in the previous administration. 38 The mechanism for shaping was through theater engagement plans (TEPs), directed by the regional combatant commanders. region. 43 One of its tenets is that change must take place gradually and be led by locals.
Another tenet is that bigger changes that address the root causes of terrorism and its spread in the region must take place over years, if not decades, the so-called "long war" approach. Despite a clear national strategy calling for economic and political engagement to promote development of Western-based democratic and economic values as a key driver to shaping a stable and secure global environment, the US military continued to view these activities as secondary to its primary mission of warfighting. The advent of 9/11, the ensuing GWOT, and the glaring omission of US war plans to include SSTR operations in its Iraq strategy, compelled US national security advisors to re-look the "shaping" strategy of NSS 2000 and revitalize PDD 56 calling for an interagency approach to these complex issues.
Many of these undergoverned lands are also areas where the security environment for civilians is compromised. Under such circumstances -because the interagency is precluded from exercising diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power, --the military must be equipped and prepared to respond across the spectrum of hybrid war to restore and maintain stability and security. Once the military establishes safe conditions the interagency can resume its functions. Like Nehemiah, the US military of the future must be prepared to build walls and simultaneously defend them.
Endnotes 1 In 600 BCE, Nehemiah, Hebrew captive in Babylon, returned to Jerusalem for reconstruction operations on the ancient city, which was lying in waste after the ravages of both intertribal war and conquest from regional powers. Neighboring tribes from Samaria and Arabian Peninsula threatened by a resurgence of the Jewish state, attempted to destabilize these operations through a series of covert and overt terrorist tactics. To achieve his mission objectives, Nehemiah developed a kind of hybrid strategy where his teams simultaneously performed both reconstruction and force protection operations, demonstrating an ability to shift seamlessly from one role to the other as the security environment required. environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area (Uncertain Environment), or an operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose or react effectively to the operations a unit intends to conduct (Hostile Environment)." Interagency operations in Iraq are an example of where force protection (FORCEPRO) requirements confine operation of US civilian agencies to the so-called Green Zone inside Baghdad or outside Iraq completely to Jordan, Qattar, and Kuwait. 35 Ibid. Article 23 of this piece describes hybrid war in counterinsurgency at the tactical level: "Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow's hierarchy as each successive need is met . . . . Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else, not least the insurgents, so civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid (local communities and leaders) to help you help them." 36 Another common characteristic of this war is a form of offensive maneuver of the rapid and highly mobile checkpoint. Mobile units, usually consisting of mounted infantry combat engineers and TOW vehicles, move forward to key intersections in areas where armed regular or guerilla fighters operate and set up hasty roadblocks in order to disrupt unauthorized or unwanted military activity. This mission requires designated soldiers to detain and search intruders, a sizable element to overwatch the hasty checkpoint, air cover on station, mobile mortar support, and a quick reinforcement of TOW and infantry carriers that can extract the flying checkpoint force from trouble or reinforce it. This technique is valuable in controlling very large sectors with the same battalion-sized units.
If the final stage of direct and concentrated force becomes imminent, these same combat units are immediately capable of transitioning to full combat roles. Time standards and increasing levels of alert, previously specified, immediately shift into tactical offensive movements. Pre-established alert reaction forces, organic artillery batteries and pre-staged air support allow for immediate employment of swift and decisive offensive actions. John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peacekeepers," Military Review, March 1993. 37 Ibid. U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2005, 15: "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destructionweapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." 
